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BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE 1
As a "rogue elephant in the forest", "the United States has come, for the time being, to be regarded in Europe … less as the mainspring of civilization and more as the generator of crude power". 2 The metaphor dates from 1973, an era characterized by severe transatlantic tensions in the context of the Yom Kippur War, the oil crisis and Henry A. Kissinger's failed initiative for a "Year of Europe". The early 1970s were marked by a highly skeptical American attitude towards the first signs of European foreign policy coordination. While the American stance vis-à-vis European unification has always been characterized by a certain degree of ambivalence, in many ways the policy pursued by President Richard M. Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger can be interpreted as a high point of tensions. The policy was the first important manifestation-not by single individuals within an Administration, but by the highest political representatives of the United States themselves-of open fear and suspicion of European integration. It is therefore interesting to examine the vision expressed by the Nixon-Kissinger team more closely. 3 Two broad views of Europe expressed by American leaders after the Second World War can be distinguished. One can be identified with the Administration of President John F. Kennedy. President Kennedy repeatedly expressed high hopes for the European Community as a burden-sharing partner. 4 Kennedy's vision of Atlantic interdependence, coupled with the rhetoric of the "equal partnership", can be considered as a prominent manifestation of a confident, cooperative American hegemony. According to the Kennedy Administration, the Europeans needed "to move toward substantial internal cohesion in order to provide the solid foundations upon which the structure of an Atlantic partnership can be erected".
5
In other words, European unity was "an essential prerequisite" to the development of strong Atlantic ties. 6 Kennedy's Under Secretary of State, George Ball, repeated on numerous occasions that "a strong partnership must almost by definition mean a collaboration of equals". 7 As long as Europe remained in its fragmented state, the Kennedy Administration expected that the Europeans would naturally shy away from a real Atlantic partnership. Without internal strength and unity, Europe would refrain from getting institutionally close to the United States. Europeans would fear becoming simple "ancillaries" of American policy. 8 Since the mid-1960s, Kissinger had been attacking the assumptions on which Kennedy's burden-sharing expectations were based. Kissinger was convinced that by encouraging 1 The author would like to express his sincere thanks to Harri Kalimo for his many constructive suggestions and improvements of the initial draft. 2 Both parts of this sentence were quoted by James Chace (1973, 96) . Chace has attributed the "rogue elephant" quote to Raymond Vernon and the "crude power" citation to Alastair Buchan. 3 For the American ambivalence regarding European integration, see Harper (1996) . 4 Kennedy 1962, 132 . 5 Ball 1962, 366 . 6 Ball 1968 , 61. 7 Ball 1962 . 8 Ball 1968, 66-67. European unity, the United States was in fact creating its own rival. The start of a new system of European foreign policy cooperation in 1970 was seen by Kissinger as a particularly important example of Europe's attempt to challenge the American hegemony. Kissinger emphasized the need to maintain Western Europe in a subordinate role. The Nixon-Kissinger vision can be interpreted as an expression of distrustful, defensive hegemony, requiring constant reassurance of loyalty and obedience by the European partners.
The burden sharing vision of Kennedy and the rivalry oriented vision of Nixon and Kissinger continue to influence American foreign policy today. This paper concentrates on the NixonKissinger view.
As to the structure of this paper, Chapter 2 briefly examines the general rhetoric of the Nixon Administration with respect to the development of the European Community. Chapter 3 puts the focus on the Nixon-Kissinger strategy for keeping the West Europeans under control. Three main lines of action are reviewed: maintaining bilateral contacts with key European allies, requesting a seat at the Community's decision-making table, and linking "obedient" European behavior to American military presence in Europe. Chapter 3 also analyzes the legacy of these three lines of strategy on current American policy on the EU. Indeed, this paper concludes by claiming in Chapter 4 that the Nixon-Kissinger legacy is in many respects detrimental to rather than conducive of good transatlantic relations. The current tendencies to emulate it should therefore be abandoned.
THE NIXON-KISSINGER PERSPECTIVE ON A "THIRD FORCE" EUROPE

Kissinger's theoretical "five power" concept
At the start of his Presidency, Nixon put forth a Kissinger-inspired concept of a world system resting on an arrangement between the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan and Western Europe. 9 Kissinger was an admirer of the Congress of Vienna and initially seemed to believe that-still in the second half of the 20 th century-the five major powers had to maintain the global balance-of-power. 10 In Nixon's words: "I think we will be a safer and a better world if we have a stronger, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing against the other, an even balance".
11
In line with his "five power" concept, Nixon gave signs that he was inclined to encourage the development of the European Community as a "third force". In 1969, following talks with French President Charles De Gaulle, Nixon made a statement in support of a Gaullist Europe:
"[De Gaulle] believes that Europe should have an independent position in its own right. And, frankly, I believe that too … the world will be a much safer place and, from our standpoint, a much healthier place economically, militarily and politically, if there were a strong European Community to be a balance … between the United States and the Soviet Union".
12
Nixon reiterated this view at a National Security Council meeting in January 1970, with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson attending: "I have never been one who believes the U.S. should have control of the actions of Europe … I have preferred that Europe move independently, going parallel with the United States. A strong, healthy and independent Europe is good for the balance of the world". 13 On the surface, Kissinger seemed to agree.
In contrast with those in "the bureaucracy" who strongly opposed a European caucus in the defense field, Kissinger claimed that "efforts to create a more coherent European voice in NATO are in our net interest". In a note to Nixon, he 
Kissinger's skeptical view of European integration
The philosophy set out above is, however, to a large degree in contradiction with the actual policy pursued during Nixon's and Kissinger's time in public office. In fact, such 9 See Chace (1973, 96) . 10 Kissinger's doctoral dissertation was devoted to the Congress of Vienna. See Kissinger (1956, 264-80; 1957) . 11 Cited by Gaddis (1982, 280) . 12 Nixon 1969, 246 . My attention to this quote was drawn by William C. Cromwell (1974, 40-41 "The assumption that a united Europe and the United States would inevitably conduct parallel policies and have similar views about appropriate tactics runs counter to historical experience. A separate unity has usually been established by opposition to a dominant power. The European sense of identity is unlikely to be an exception to this general rule -its motives could well be to insist on a specifically European view of the world … which is another way of saying that it will challenge American hegemony in Atlantic policy".
16
In other words, postwar American foreign policy had for Kissinger rested on the wrongful assumption "that a united Europe would ease Atlantic relations, that it would inevitably pursue compatible policies while sharing a greater part of our burdens". Kissinger left no doubt that he "had never believed the results of European integration to be nearly so automatic".
17
As National Security Advisor, Kissinger looked with particular concern at the start of Andrianopoulos (1988, 66-73 and 90-110) . 17 Kissinger 1979, 399. 18 On this episode, see Bahr (2003, 30 and 44) . 19 Hanrieder 1978, 195. 20 Barnett 1983 , 292. See also Lippert (2005 . 21 Nixon 1971 16-17. 22 Kissinger 1974, 29 . In his memoirs, Kissinger stated that he was merely "describing a condition that we deplored". See Kissinger (1982, 161 were docking at German ports to receive American munitions. The United States had not bothered to inform the German government about the shipments. When Bonn asked that such shipments be stopped, this greatly upset Kissinger. He declared that he was going to "raise hell" with the Germans. In a meeting with the German Ambassador, he stated to be "astounded" by Bonn's decision and argued that the West Europeans had "deliberately isolated" Washington.
26
The second test of transatlantic coherence during the Yom Kippur war took place when the United States failed to consult its NATO partners when it decided to launch a world-wide nuclear alert at DEFCON III-level to prevent a military intervention by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Administration continued to keep the allies in the dark during the negotiations with the Soviets to force a cease-fire on the belligerents, although this directly affected the allies' Cold War interests. Instead of applauding Washington for having taken a major "risk to defend the global equilibrium", the Europeans "concentrated on the indisputable fact that there had been no prior consultation over an alert that involved U.S. troops stationed in Europe". Nixon and Kissinger were much less sympathetic to the European complaints. Nixon publicly "chastised" the West Europeans for their lack of support in the crisis. 30 In his meeting with the German Ambassador, Kissinger emphasized that he was particularly concerned about "the total pattern of European behavior". He underlined that "[a]s one who has long favored European integration, it would be ironic now if the fathers of European integration in the U.S. could see … that unity developing in opposition to the U.S., or that unity making cooperation with the U.S. more rather than less difficult". Given the lack of understanding shown by the European allies, Kissinger told the German Ambassador that he was asking himself "fundamental questions". He noted "that when he had spoken publicly of Europe having only a regional interest, he was attacked by his European colleagues. Now when something happens in an area of interest to Europe, Europeans disassociate themselves completely". See also Binder 1973 , 65 (quoted in Lippert (2005 However, in spite of his preliminary "low profile" philosophy, Kissinger soon started arguing for a better American grip on the European integration process. Active American involvement in European affairs was necessary to ensure Europe's Atlantic orientation. Three main lines of action were pursued:
(1) maintaining bilateral contacts with key allies within the Community; (2) requesting a seat at the Community's decision-making table; and (3) linking European behavior to American military presence in Europe. President Kennedy's preferred option of obtaining an indirect voice in European affairs through the Community's enlargement with Atlantic-minded countries was not one of Kissinger's priorities. Kissinger looked at the Community's enlargement with a degree of suspicion. He feared that a country's entry into the Community, and its resulting "europeanization", might well imply a reduction of American influence.
Bilateralism
Kissinger preferred strong bilateral ties with the European allies, because they constituted the most effective way for the United States to exert its influence on Europe. Kissinger's insistence on bilateralism was based on "his basic antipathy over the prospect of a united Europe speaking with one voice". "meaningful consultation with other nations becomes very difficult when the internal process of decision-making already has some of the characteristics of compacts between quasi-sovereign entities … There is an increasing reluctance to hazard a hard-won domestic consensus in an international forum".
43
The European Community presented Kissinger with a concrete example of his earlier observations. The creation of the European Community, and especially of EPC, threatened to destroy the good old custom "that the nations of the Atlantic -and especially the large countries -exchange ideas on outstanding issues in many informal contacts whose vitality was enhanced by their spontaneity". 44 In the EPC, the Europeans would not only try to speak with a single voice. They "would share among themselves all information which they obtain in the framework of bilateral exchanges with the U.S. In other words, confidential bilateral exchanges … were at an end". 45 The Community's efforts to speak with one voice on world affairs were described by Nixon as "ganging up" against the United States.
46
To avoid being cornered by a unified European bloc, Nixon and Kissinger continuously emphasized the importance of maintaining bilateral relations: "For many years to come, these [bilateral relations with the several European countries] will provide essential transatlantic bonds; and we will therefore continue to broaden and deepen them".
47
Bilateral contacts with member states were carefully planned, notably in preparation of Community Summits. The French don't get along with the Germans, the Germans don't get along with the British. It will be some time before they can learn to act as a group. This means we have to work with the heads of government in the various countries and not that jackass in the European Commission in Brussels". Nixon 1970, 32 . For a similar remark, see Kissinger (1974, 30 Calleo (1975, 103-12); Lieber, (1983, 17-20) ; Yergin (1991, 626-31) Jobert (1974b, 90-93; 1974a, 82-86; 1975, 280-87) . 55 Lieber 1983, 331 . 56 Calleo 1982, 116. 57 Quoted by Pierre Hassner (2005, 75) . Haass is quoted along the same lines by Ash (2004, 5) ; as well as Dombey and Dinmore (2004) . 58 Haass 2005, 165-66. For the neo-conservative rationale in favor of "cherry-picking" in the transatlantic context, see Hulsman (2003) . 59 Whether the Administration of Bush, Jr. is actually pursuing a policy of "disaggregation" is discussed by Peterson (2004a, 620-23; 2004b, 17 In 2003, the accession states of Central and Eastern Europe all issued declarations in support of the invasion of Iraq, outside the EU context. While France and Germany expressed anger, the accession countries were praised by the Bush Administration and the U.S. Congress as "courageous", "responsible" and "bold". 62 In fact, the episode constituted a dramatic demonstration of the lack of European unity on a crucial foreign policy question. Entirely in the Nixon-Kissinger spirit, the Bush Administration never mentioned Europe's failure to act in common as a "problem".
"Seat at the table" requests
To suppress Europe's "emancipatory" developments, the Nixon Administration soon discovered that bilateralism alone did not suffice. In May 1970, during Washington's evaluation of the European Community's preferential trade agreements and planned enlargement, the Departments of the Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture emphasized that the United States needed to actively seek the establishment of "continuing consultative mechanisms" with the Community. These mechanisms were deemed essential to ensure that the United States would be kept informed and able to register its concerns on the Community's developments.
63
The American request resulted, in August 1970, in a verbal understanding on the organization of semi-annual consultations with the European Commission regarding matters of mutual interest. 64 For Kissinger, this arrangement lacked a concrete possibility to intervene in the Community's decision-making. The United States could not afford to sit back and wait till it was confronted with undesirable European positions. Instead, Kissinger tried to ensure that the American voice was heard during the European deliberations, before the member states had fixed their final stance. In January 1973, he proposed President Nixon to ask British Prime Minister Edward Heath that the European Community would refrain from making decisions before the United States were given an opportunity to register its views in the formative period of policy-making. 65 Nixon did raise the issue, but be done jointly and of the limits we should impose on the scope of our autonomy". In what turned out as a shocking experience for Nixon and Kissinger, the Europeans decided to prepare -among themselves -the common reply that would be given to Washington. As Kissinger recalls, "the European nations had decided that they would work on a paper (on Atlantic relations, no less) without any consultation with us. We would be shown no drafts; we would have no opportunity to express our views". 71 Nixon and Kissinger were dismayed.
In a letter to German Chancellor Willy Brandt, Nixon wrote that he found it inconceivable that "an endeavor whose purpose was to create a new spirit of Atlantic solidarity and whose essence should have been that it was collaborative at all stages should now be turned almost into a European-American confrontation". 72 In a similar message to German
Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, Kissinger expressed his "astonishment" that "the Europeans would not deal with us bilaterally, that we would have to await the results of the consultations of the Nine, and then deal with the Nine as a unit". 73 By September 1973, the European Community had agreed internally on a proposal for a joint declaration. For the Nixon Administration it was a document of "generalities and platitudes", without any trace of procedures for early consultations between the United States and the European Community.
74
The chances of obtaining a productive outcome for the "Year of Europe" worsened dramatically due to the transatlantic tensions during the Yom Kippur War. During a meeting with the German Ambassador in October 1973, Kissinger said he had "begun to be bored" by the project of the EC-US declaration "and was not sure it was worth further consultations". 75 On 12 December 1973, Kissinger nevertheless made a final effort. He declared that " [t] o present the decisions of a unifying Europe to us as faits accomplis not subject to effective discussion is alien to the tradition of US -European relations". He claimed that "as an old ally, the United States should be given an opportunity to express its concerns before final decisions affecting its interests are taken".
76
The Europeans did not change their position. Instead, the Member States agreed that the "Year of Europe" was an appropriate moment to define their European identity. In a formal statement adopted at the Copenhagen Summit of December 1973, the heads of state and government underlined their "determination … to establish themselves as a distinct and 68 Ibid., 36. The proposal for a new Atlantic Charter had first been made by Secretary of Commerce Peter Peterson. In a memorandum on transatlantic relations of November 1972, he proposed that the Administration would "seek a long-term, perhaps 10 years, compact or covenant of a cross-sectoral nature in which agreements on trade, defense, energy, monetary and other policies would be pulled together and in which we would articulate a new set of principles to govern our relationship -a new Atlantic Charter, as it were". See U.S. Department of State (1972e, doc.106) . 69 Hillenbrand 1998, 331. 70 Ibid. 71 Kissinger 1982, 188. 72 The Letter from President Richard M. Nixon to Chancellor Willy Brandt of 30 July 1973 is cited in Kissinger (1982, 191) . See also Burr and Wampler (2002, 30-31) . 73 Burr and Wampler 2002, 31 . 74 Cromwell 1992, 84. See also Burr and Wampler (2002, 38) . 75 Burr and Wampler 2002, 38. 76 Kissinger 1973, 43. original entity" in world affairs. 77 While mentioning the need for close ties between the United States and the European Community, the European leaders emphasized that the transatlantic dialogue had to be maintained "on the basis of equality".
78
By March 1974, the Nixon Administration ceased pressing for a formal declaration on relations between the United States and the European Community. 79 As an alternative, the allies decided to pursue pragmatic transatlantic consultations on three parallel tracks:
-Consultations between the European Commission and the United States were to continue on the basis of the understanding of 1970. The semi-annual meetings focused largely on economic topics within the field of responsibility of the Community.
80
-Consultations between EPC and the United States grew out of a pragmatic arrangement between German Chancellor Willy Brandt and President Nixon. 81 The Brandt-Nixon approach is known as the Gymnich formula as it was adopted by the Community's Ministers of Foreign Affairs during their June 1974 meeting at Gymnich, Germany. Following this meeting, the country occupying the six-monthly Presidency of the European Community Council was authorized to hold consultations with "allied or friendly countries" on the elaboration of a common European position of foreign policy. The Ministers trusted that this would lead to "smooth and pragmatic consultations with the United States which will take into account the interest of both sides".
82
-Consultations within the North Atlantic Alliance were given new impetus by the Ottawa Declaration adopted by the North Atlantic Council in June 1974. The allies stated that they were "firmly resolved to keep each other fully informed and to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations" on matters relating to their common interests as members of the Alliance.
83
None of the consultative arrangements have met Kissinger's initial objective. Many observers have concluded that "in the hindsight of history the most remarkable outcome of the 1973 round of declarations may well be the European Communities' statement on European identity". 84 In other words: "the new American approach seemed, unwittingly, to goad Western Europe to greater unity". 85 Still, to this day, Kissinger is lamenting that that "the United States is excluded -by definition, as it were -from those activities which demand the greatest attention of Europe's leaders":
86 "In dealing with the European Union … the United States is excluded from the decision-making process and interacts only after the event, with spokesmen for decisions taken by ministers at meetings in which the United States has not participated at any level. When America encounters spokesmen for the unified Europe, it discovers that its interlocutors have very little flexibility, because 77 Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government 1973, 492-96. 78 Ibid., para.14. 79 Cromwell 1992, 93. See also Burr and Wampler (2002, 38) . 80 Krenzler 1988, 97 . 81 Featherstone and Ginsberg 1996, 86. 82 Krenzler 1988, 98; Featherstone and Ginsberg 1996, 86. 83 North Atlantic Council 1974, para.11. 84 Pierre 1974, 114 . 85 Hoffmann 1977 , 67. 86 Kissinger 2001b decisions taken by the Council of Ministers can be altered only by going through the entire internal European process again." 87 In May 2003, entirely along Kissinger's line of thought, a bipartisan group of former American foreign policy and defense officials called for the adoption of "a mechanism … that allows more direct consultation between the United States and the institutional bodies of the EU". In all relevant areas, "members of the U.S. executive branch could be associated --with the work of separate European Councils". The key issue, they said, was "not one of U.S. membership in the European Union, but one of association, dialogue, and cooperation before decisions are reached". 88 The proposal was rejected by the Europeans. 89 The advocates of an American seat at the Community Linkage politics has continued in the post-Nixon era. Still, in the current geopolitical context, the threat of a possible withdrawal of troops no longer makes the same Cold War impression. In this sense, the implosion of the Soviet Union has deprived the United States of a bargaining weapon that was frequently used in Cold War dealings with the allies. Cromwell (1974, 42) . For a similar wording, see Nixon (1973, 79 
Enlargement
CONCLUSIONS
As an academic, Kissinger shifted from the vision of five world powers-which included a strong Europe-to believing that by encouraging European unity, the United States was, in fact, creating its own rival. In spite of the rhetoric at the start of the Nixon Administration, Kissinger's emphasis was on the need to maintain Western Europe in a subordinate role. Europe's attempt at "emancipating" itself, via a new system of European foreign policy cooperation, was seen by Kissinger as an important challenge to American hegemony. The Nixon-Kissinger strategy for keeping the West Europeans under control consisted of three main lines of action: (1) insisting on bilateral contacts with key allies within the Community; (2) requesting a seat at the Community's decision-making table; and (3) linking "obedient" European behavior to American military presence in Europe.
When examining the legacy of the Nixon-Kissinger team for the American attitude on European political cooperation, elements of continuity and discontinuity become evident. On the one hand, the Kissinger vision on European political integration still has its followers today. Kissinger's attitude towards the creation of EPC was similar to America's current, skeptical approach towards the emergence of Europe as an autonomous actor in foreign and defense policy. Nixon and Kissinger's net preference for bilateral contacts and their rejection of a "single voice Europe" is similar to Bush Jr.'s fondness for bilateralism, "disaggregation" and "coalitions of the willing". The commonalities in approaches have also led to similarities in the results-foremost, a regrettable deterioration of transatlantic relations.
On the other hand, there are also major differences between the policies of the NixonKissinger team and Bush Jr. It remains to be seen whether the post-Cold War compensation policy will turn out to be a winning strategy for the United States in the long run. It is not a good sign that the policy seems inspired by a Kissinger-like mood of "fear and suspicion" towards the development of an autonomous European voice in world affairs. 114 Kissinger's frame of mind did, indeed, prove disruptive to the harmonious development of transatlantic relations. His attempts at subjugating Europe neither strengthened the United States, nor Europe. It only contributed to a deterioration of the transatlantic climate and created a self-fulfilling prophesy by pushing the Europeans into adopting their declaration on European identity in international affairs. Current tendencies to emulate aspects of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy should therefore be strongly discouraged. Instead, the transatlantic partners would be welladvised to look for inspiration in Kennedy's vision of interdependence and equal partnership. The purpose should be that of developing an active burden-sharing arrangement that goes well beyond the narrowly-conceived militaristic perspective and focuses on such fundamental issues as sustainable development, human rights and the rule of law. Only a strong and independent Europe can serve as a mature partner in such an endeavor.
